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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-PROVABILITY AND PruoRITY OF A BACK PAY AwARD-The
NLRB entered a back pay order against the employer. Four months later, and
before the order was enforced, the employer was adjudicated a bankrupt. Thereafter, the court enforced the back pay order and the NLRB filed proof of claim
in the bankruptcy proceeding. The referee disallowed the claim, but on petition for review the district court1 set aside the referee's order and gave the claim
priority over general creditors. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit2 affirmed, holding (I) that the back pay award was a provable claim,under section
63a(l) of the Bankruptcy Act as a fixed liability evidenced by a judgment,3
and (2) that it was entitled to fifth priority under section 64a(5) as a debt
owed to the United States.4 This precise question had previously been presented to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in NLRB v. Killoren5
where the back pay award was held to be (I) a provable claim under section
63a(4) as a debt on an implied contract,6 and (2) entitled to second priority as
wages earned under section 64a(2).7 To resolve this conffict, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed and remanded. A back pay
order is a provable claim under section 63a(4) and is entitled to second priority
under section 64a(2); however the bankruptcy court should remit the award to
the NLRB and allow a reasonable time for its liquidation by that agency. Nathason v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 73 S.Ct. 80 (1952).
While the ultimate decisions differed, the courts of appeals of both circuits
agreed, as an initial premise, that the policy of the National Labor Relations
Act would best be served by allowing a back pay award to be a claim provable
in bankruptcy. A review of authorities substantiates the soundness of this proposition. Although a back pay award undoubtedly has a deterrent effect upon
the employer,3 it has been consistently held that the primary purpose of such
an award is to compensate employees for losses suffered because of an unfair
labor practice,9 and to assure them that their wages will not be jeopardized
In re MacKenzie Coach Lines, Inc., (D.C. Mass. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 489.
Nathason v. NLRB, (1st Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 248, noted in 100 Umv. PA. L.
R.Ev. 1237 (1952).
3 52 Stat. L. 873, §63a(l) (1938), 11 U.S.C. (1946) §l03a(l).
4 52 Stat. L. 874, §64a(5) (1938), 11 U.S.C. (1946) §104a(5).
5 (8th Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 609, cert. den. 314 U.S. 696, 62 S.Ct. 412 (1941),
noted in 90 Umv. PA. L. R.Ev. 100 (1941); 55 HARv. L. R.Ev. 539 (1942).
6 52 Stat. L. 873, §63a(4) (1938), 11 U.S.C. (1946) §103a(4).
7 52 Stat. L. 874, §64a(2) (1938), 11 U.S.C. (1946) §104a(2).
s If the sole purpose of the back pay award had been to deter the employer from the
commission of future unfair labor practices, there would be no reason for allowing it as
a provable claim. The order can have no such effect on an employer in bankruptcy because
the struggle is then between the various creditors. See 40 CoL. L. R.Ev. 1272 (1940),
criticizing the decision In the Matter of Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., (D.C. Mo. 1940)
CCH LAB. LAw SEnv., 2d ed., ,rl8,650, which was subsequently reversed in NLRB v.
Killoren, note 5 supra.
9 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 59 S.Ct. 490 (1939); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206 (1938).
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through the proper exercise of their rights. 10 If this underlying policy is to be
fully realized, the employees' rights to back pay should not be lost by a subsequent act on the part of the employer,11 such as bankruptcy. Because there is
no specific language providing for the provability of a back pay award under section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act, and to avoid the necessity of resorting to a special
legislative enactment,12 it was imperative to fit the award into one of the existing
categories. The Supreme Court chose to reaffirm the doctrine of the Killoren
case and to analogize the back pay award to an implied contract under section
63a(4). While no reasons were given for rejecting the approach of the lower
court in treating this as a judgment under section 63a(l),13 this result appears
to be more satisfactory at least from a standpoint of precedent. 14 As far as the
practical outcome is concerned, there seems to be little difference whether the
award is regarded as an implied contract or as a judgment, because in either
instance the policy of the National Labor Relations Act is effectuated by holding the claim to be provable.
The degree of priority to be afforded the award has greater significance
because it may have a direct bearing on the percentage of the claim which will
eventually be realized. Having taken the position that the purposes of the
National Labor Relations Act should be served by recognizing the award as a
claim against the bankrupt's estate, the Supreme Court approached the question
of priority solely in the context of the Bankruptcy Act. First, the court rejected
the contention that the award should be entitled to fifth priority as a debt owed
to the United States.15 While the award may technically be a debt owed the

lOPhelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845 (1941). Republic
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 3ll U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77 (1940).
11 Other courts have minimized the deterrent effect of a back pay award by holding
that its validity was not impaired by events subsequent to its issuance. NLRB v. Colton,
(6th Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 179 (deceased partner's estate held liable with surviving
partners for back pay award against partnership); NLRB v. Timken Silent Automatic Co.,
(2d Cir. 1940) ll4 F. (2d) 449 (corporation held liable for back pay order issued during
its existence but not affirmed until after its charter had expired); Waterman S.S. Co. v.
NLRB, (5th Cir. 1941) ll9 F. (2d) 760 (employer held liable for back pay order in favor
of a seaman even though he subsequently sold his ship).
12 See Lane v. Industrial Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 338, which
decision was closely followed by an amendment to §63 of the Bankruptcy Act making
workmen's compensation awards expressly provable in bankruptcy. 48 Stat. L. 923,
§63a(6) (1934), II U.S.C. (1946) §l03a(6).
13 Technically this was not a judgment because the back pay order had not been
enforced by the court at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed. Nevertheless, the
lower courts entertained the view that the word "judgment" had a broader connotation as
used in the context of §63 of the Bankruptcy Act. See In re Mackenzie Coach Lines, Inc.,
note l supra, at 490.
14 In the leading case of Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 57 S.Ct. 545 (1937), the
statutory liability imposed upon bank stockholders was held to be quasi-contractual in origin
• and hence a claim provable in bankruptcy. Gou.um, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., §63.24
(1941), suggests that §63a(4) has been expanded beyond its apparent scope and has become
a basis for the proof of statutory rights. But contra Lane v. Industrial Commissioner, note
12 supra; In re Paramount Publix Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 644.
15 This priority operates in conjunction with Rev. Stat. §3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C.
(1941) §191, giving the United States first satisfaction from insolvents.
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United States through the agency of the NLRB, 16 it does not fall within the
spirit of this priority classification. It has been held that the policy behind
allowing the United States preferential payment from insolvents is to secure
adequate public revenue.17 The reason for this rule fails when the beneficiaries of the claims are private persons as is the case here.18 The Supreme
Court again followed the Killoren case by holding that the back pay award
should be entitled to second priority under section 64a(2) as wages earned
within three months of bankruptcy with a maximum limit not to exceed $600
per claimant. This priority of payment was intended to protect those who are
dependent upon wages for their livelihood and who are generally not aware of
their employer's financial status. 19 The limitations on this priority are consistent with this policy because after either a three month delay in payment
or a $600 wage claim the wage earner should be put on notice of his employer's
financial difficulty and should bear the risk of continued employment. However, when this priority is applied in favor of the claimant of a back pay aw~d,
often the practical effect is to throw him into the class of general creditors
because of his failure to comply with the three month limitation.2 Consequently, he is deprived of the priority even though he has had no reason to be
wary of the employer's financial position as in the usual case of delayed pay•
ment. Although this result may not be entirely satisfactory, it does give the
back pay claimant the most favorable position permissible under the existing
language of the Bankruptcy Act without violating the purpose of the governmental priority under section 64a(5). Moreover, any harsh effect on the
employee will be minimized by the fact that he can secure other employment
during the period of his discharge, thereby mitigating the amount of his actual
loss. The employee will generally wish to pursue this course in any event
because of the possibility that the NLRB may refuse to grant a back pay order
in the first instance.
Peter Van Domelen, S.Ed.

°

16 The back pay award is not a private right, but can be enforced only by the NLRB,
Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 309 U.S. 261,
60 S.Ct. 561 (1940), and the employees need not be made parties to the action, National
Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 60 S.Ct. 569 (1940).
.
17 United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 31 U.S. 29 (1832).
18 American Surety Co. v. Akron Savings Bank, 212 U.S. 557, 29 S.Ct. 686 (1908).
Compare Bramwell v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 269 U.S. 483, 46 S.Ct. 176 (1926),
where the priority under Rev. Stat. §3466 (1875) was afforded the United States for the
collection of Indian moneys on the theory that the Indians were the wards of the government.
19 Blessing v. Blanchard, (9th Cir. 1915) 223 F. 35. Matter of Lawsam Electric Co.,
Inc., (D.C. N.Y. 1924) 300 F. 736. See also CoLLIEn, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., §64.201
(1941).
.
20 There is an inevitable lag occasioned by the NLRB proceedings to determine the
'Propriety of the reinstatement order and the back pay award. In both the Killoren and
Nathason cases, the wage claimant was unable to meet the three month limitation.

